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PEACE AS A GLOBAL PUBLIC GOOD1
BJØRN MØLLER∗
 
Conceptual Clarification 
The questions whether peace and/or stability can be labelled public goods, and 
what the implications may be of so doing, form the theme of the present article. 
I shall not elaborate on the general theory of public goods,2 but merely point to a 
few terminological problems. 
 
Public Goods and Evils  
The term “public goods” refers to goods which are characterised by being 
available to all, i.e. to all members of a particular system such as a national or an 
international society. As nobody can be deprived of the right and the 
opportunities to benefit from the public good, there is no direct linkage between 
the availability of these benefits, i.e. the production of the public good, and the 
consumption of it. This gives all members an incentive to “cheat” in terms of 
production, i.e. for “free-riding”3—a well-known phenomenon from, e.g., 
alliances. 4
  
It may, however, make a difference whether the system in question is universal 
or merely forms part of a larger system. In the former case there is nothing 
beyond the system as such, which is thus closed, whereas all subsystems are 
open and corresponding with the rest of the system. The “public goods” enjoyed 
by the white minority in apartheid South Africa—including the privileges 
derived from skin colour enjoyed by all whites regardless of their attitude to the 
regime—were thus not genuine public goods, but rather “club goods” enjoyed 
by the “members” at the expense of the rest of society.5 The same might even be 
said about many of the public goods of the developed world, which some argue 
accrue from the exploitation of the Third World.6 This does not necessarily 
imply that it never makes sense to talk of public goods at the level of a (regional 
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or other) sub-system, but should merely serve as a caveat about the inherent 
limitations of the concept.   
 
Confusion may also arise with regard to the second half of the concept, i.e. that 
of goods. First of all, there is no universal unanimity about what counts as 
goods, e.g. whether freedom is a good or rather a license for amorality. 
Secondly, there is no unanimity about the appropriate rank-ordering of good, 
e.g. about whether to prioritise “honour” (in itself a controversial concept) over 
prosperity. Thirdly, “goods” can not merely be defined in positive terms, but 
also negatively, i.e. as an absence of “bads” or evils—just as health may be 
defined as an absence of disease and peace as an absence of war (vide infra). 
Public goods may thus be tantamount to either the absence of “public evils” (e.g. 
war, genocide, pollution or climatic changes) or to a general absence of such 
“individual evils” as HIV-AIDS, to which the same rule applies, i.e. that an 
actor cannot escape them by his own devices. 
 
As we shall see below, the concepts of peace, security and stability are just as 
ambiguous as that of public goods. Before proceeding to this, however, a brief 
account of the views about global public goods held by the various theories of 
international relations seems in order.  
  
IR Theories on Public Goods 
Within IR (international relations) theory the various schools or “paradigms” 
have different views on the problematique of public goods.  
 
Liberalism (previously known as idealism) holds a generally optimistic view on 
the problem, thereby exposing itself to the critique (on the part of “realists”) for 
being utopian.7 As the production of a public good (e.g. peace) will benefit all, it 
will also take place, either because decision-makers will be persuaded of the 
need to do so, or almost automatically, e.g. by means of Adam Smith’s 
“invisible hand”, working through the market mechanisms.8  
 
Every individual ... generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public 
interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. By preferring the support of 
domestic to that of foreign industry he intends only his own security; and by 
directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest 
value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led 
by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. 
 
As a means to ensure the good will of decision-makers, some liberalists have 
envisioned a global democracy of sorts, basing themselves on the belief that if 
only decisions are taken democratically they will automatically reflect the real 
interests of the majority which will invariably be to maximise the public good.9
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Realism has all along been considerably more pessimistic about the possibilities 
of thus maximising common interests, ever since Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote 
his critique of Abbé de Saint-Pierre’s  blueprint for en eternal peace.10 If one 
presupposes rational and utility-maximising actors, these will all be trapped in 
what is often called dilemmas, but might rather be labelled paradoxes. This is 
the case of Rousseau’s famous “stag hunt”11 and of Kenneth Waltz’s “tyranny of 
small decisions”,12  producing what others have called the “tragedy of the 
commons”,13 just as it is the case of the classical “security dilemma” (vide 
infra).14 If everybody traces private goods the result may well be the production 
of public evils such as over-grazing or war, simply because the system and its 
rules makes this inevitable.  
 
The fact that the liberal and realist perspectives are logical opposites does not 
rule out combinations or syntheses uniting elements of both, as we have seen in 
the so-called “neo-neo debate”.15 This debate within “mainstream IR” between 
neorealists and liberalists (now labelled “neoliberal institutionalists”) has mainly 
revolved around the saliency of absolute and relative gains of cooperation, e.g. 
over the production of public goods. Neoliberals have emphasised the 
importance of absolute gains as a sufficient propellant for cooperation, whereas 
neorealists have focused on the risks entailed by ignoring relative gains. Even 
when cooperation is mutually advantageous it may tilt the balance of power 
between the parties cooperating if the relationship is more beneficial to one than 
the other.16
 
Neoliberalists have typically acknowledged that this may be the case (e.g. in 
relationships such as that between East and West during the Cold War) while 
maintaining that such relations are the exception rather than the rule.17 Between 
by far the majority of the world’s countries, war is simply inconceivable and the 
significance of relative gains thus negligible. This is not merely the case with so-
called “security communities” (such as that of the Nordic countries or perhaps 
the entire European Union),18 where war has become inconceivable. It also 
applies to countries which have so little to do with each other that it strains the 
imagination to envision a war between them. Denmark and Uruguay may be a 
case in point. 
 
The fact that the difference between the neoliberal and neorealist positions is 
thus merely one of degrees and estimated probabilities rather than of absolutes, 
this debate may be approaching (or already have produced)  a synthesis. A 
similar and related synthesis between neorealists and neoliberals is found in the 
theories of “cooperation among adversaries”,19 which highlight the fact that by 
far the majority of relations between states represent blends of shared and 
opposing interests. All opponents thus collaborate to a certain extent,20 and 
opting for the right strategy may render such collaboration even more likely. 
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There even seems to be a direct and positive correlation between the planning 
perspective and the feasibility of cooperation. The longer the “shadow of the 
future”, the greater importance the two parties will attach to the continuous 
collaboration and by implication the absolute gains (including the public goods) 
which this may produce, in comparison to the relative gains which they might be 
able to “cash in” in the “last round”. If the possibility of such a last round before 
the final battle is not assessed as high a far-reaching cooperation may well turn 
out to be the rational choice.21
 
To the same category of theories might be counted that of “common security”,22 
which appeared in the 1980s. It was partly intended as an escape route from the 
so-called security dilemma by way of a defensive restructuring of the armed 
forces.23 A state’s security will normally (i.e. if pursued through an arms 
buildup) entail a reduction in the security of its respective opponents, who are 
therefore likely to respond with a countervailing arms build-up, thus landing 
both sides in a situation of lesser security than before—a clear “public evil”. By 
devising strategies and force structures which maximise the defensive while 
minimising offensive strength, however, it might be possible to achieve security 
without doing so at the other side’s expense—and two opponents could thus 
simultaneously improve their national security.   
 
Certain IR analysts, including realists such as Robert Gilpin,24 have highlighted 
the fact that special rules seem to apply to the largest members of a system. For 
them there may actually be a direct correlation between consumption and 
production of public goods simply because their share of total production is so 
large that it has noticeable implications for what is available for consumption. 
Hence, the very largest members not only have the leverage to punish free-
riding, but also an obvious incentive to do so and achieve a fair distribution of 
the production. This has made various IR scholars point to hegemony (a concept 
of Greek origins, but usually associated with the political thinking of Antonio 
Gramsci)25 as the solution to the public goods problem.26 The preconditions for 
such hegemony were to a certain extent present within the two opposing 
alliances during the Cold War, just as they were within the international 
monetary system as long as the US dollar remained the universal reserve 
currency.27 The preconditions of hegemony may also be present on a regional or 
subregional level where one state often surpasses all the rest in terms of the 
relevant elements of power, as seems to be the case of South  Africa in Southern 
Africa and of Nigeria in West Africa.28
 
Regime theories may be combined with such “hegemonic stability” theories. 
They emphasise how the regulation of international relations is in the self-
interest of all states, inter alia ?? because they reduce transaction costs and other 
“negative externalities”, thereby allowing for mutually advantageous 
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cooperation and promoting the production of public goods.29 Such regime 
theories are easily compatible with hegemony theories, simply because it seems 
a reasonable assumption that the “regime entrepreneurs” (also called “drivers”) 
are typically great powers acting in their own interest, but thereby also 
promoting the common good, by adopting and enforcing the sets of norms and 
rules constituting the regime.30
 
The so-called “English School” has all along been located somewhere between 
liberalism and realism, but quite close to regime theory. Its unifying theme has 
been the notion of “international society”, i.e. the conception of the world as a 
society, constituted as such by a modicum of shared values and norms—even 
though this society remains anarchical, i.e. without any supranational authority 
comparable to the state in national societies.31 While the “solidarists” within this 
school resemble liberalist with their emphasis on international law and justice, 
its “pluralists” are closer to the views of realists with their emphasis on the 
sovereign rights of states, i.e. “order”.32 The basic tenets of the English School 
are easily compatible with theories of public goods, if only because the “order” 
of the anarchical society described by Hedley Bull constitutes a public good. 
 
Are Peace and Stability Public Goods? 
Before proceeding with the analysis of whether or how peace and stability may 
be viewed as public goods, the concepts need to be defined which is more 
controversial than one might assume. 
 
The Norwegian peace researcher Johan Galtung distinguishes between 
“positive” and “negative peace”, of which the latter refers to a simple absence of 
“direct violence” (e.g. war) whereas the former is more comprehensive and 
diffuse. Positive peace may be defined as an absence of not merely direct 
violence, but also “structural violence”, in turn defined as a “relative 
deprivation” of values.33 In the latter sense, peace is thus incompatible with, for 
instance, oppression, extreme inequality, etc. This does, however, make the 
concept almost all-encompassing, thus detracting from its analytical value. In 
the following I shall therefore focus on negative peace in the narrow sense of an 
absence of wars and other major conflicts. 
 
From this analytical point of departure it soon becomes obvious that peace thus 
understood does not imply stability in a wider sense. On the contrary, the 
absence of open war may even presuppose a profound instability such as that 
represented by an almost even balance of power.34 It is even possible to argue 
that peace is built on instability, as was indeed the official policy of the United 
States and NATO throughout the Cold War, where the philosophy was that it 
was exactly the unpredictability of the military balance which secured the peace. 
If the adversary, e.g. the USSR could not known for sure the exact location of 
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the nuclear threshold, any aggressive step would entail a risk of nuclear war, 
which in turn would deter aggression and thus ensure peace.35 A higher nuclear 
threshold (e.g. as a consequence of a no-first-use strategy for the nukes) might, 
on the one hand, improve stability by making an inadvertent nuclear less likely, 
but this might, on the other hand, actually endanger the peace.36 
 
If peace is an unconditional good, stability is thus not necessarily a good to be 
pursued in all cases. Nor is it self-evident—the positive connotations of the 
concept notwithstanding—that stability is a good at all, as the concept signifies a 
preservation of a status quo which is not automatically beneficial to all parties. 
Stability may thus (just as negative peace) be opposed to the demand for justice, 
e.g. in the sense of “distributive justice”,37 which also entails a reduction of 
inequalities, at least with regard to options. As mentioned above, inequality was 
a central element in Galtung’s concept of structural violence, which means that 
its elimination or reduction is a precondition of his “positive peace”. On the 
other hand, its abolition may occasionally require the use of direct violence, i.e. 
a breach of the negative peace. The victims of structural violence may thus have 
the right to (or at least feel entitled to) resort to direct violence, i.e. to violate the 
negative peace in order to secure positive peace by removing structural 
violence.38 We have seen this in a long chain of revolutions, beginning with the 
American and French revolutions in the 18th Century and continuing in modern 
wars of liberation—some of which have even seen a resort to means which some 
would label terrorism. 
 
It is thus far from self-evident that negative peace in the narrow sense is 
necessarily a good, much less a public good. To thus deny that peace is an 
unconditional good may appear heretical as the concept has at least as posive ?? 
connotations as “stability”. On the other hand, only radical principled pacifists 
would deny that certain wars may be just and good, hence that certain types of 
peace may be bad. If the UK had not declared war on Germany in 1939, the 
Nazis might perhaps have undertaken the Holocaust with impunity as well as 
have conquered most of Europe, including Denmark—which would surely have 
been a most unappealing negative peace. It must also be acknowledged that a 
war is always, in a certain sense, caused by the defender who always has the 
option of simply surrendering without resistance, thus avoiding a war—as 
Denmark did on the 9th of April 1940. Most would agree that wars thus “started” 
by the defender are not automatically “evil”.  
 
Peace is, furthermore, eminently dividable, and not even the so-called world 
wars have included the entire world. In all known wars, there have been neutral 
parties, either as a consequence of a deliberate policy of neutralism,39 or simply 
because the states in question happened to be outside the area of war and did not 
make the deliberate decision to nevertheless become involved. 
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Finally, there may be a rather direct link between production and consumption 
of security and peace. Indeed, this is the reason why most states field a defence 
force and/or join alliances, i.e. in order to deter attacks from other states. 
Alliance membership automatically entails a certain contribution to the 
production of the common good, as the very membership is tantamount to 
choosing sides, thereby running the risk of becoming involved in a war of which 
a state might otherwise stay aloof.40 On top of that normally comes, for obvious 
reasons, some pressure from the other alliance members to make a military 
contribution to the joint defence or deterrence.   
 
War as a public evil 
All the above qualifications notwithstanding, there can be no disputing that wars 
are generally phenomena deserving the label “public evils” in the sense of evils 
afflicting everyone, either directly or indirectly—in the latter case either because 
of the side-effects of an actual war or of the preparations for a possible war.41 
However, wars do differ also in this respect. 
 
Types of War 
In the following we shall proceed from a (perhaps excessively) simple 
categorisation of wars into pre-modern, modern, nuclear and “wars of the third 
kind”—a classification which builds on history, but nevertheless is not strictly 
historical as pre-modern wars may also occur in this day and age.  
 
Pre-modern Wars 
Medieval and even earlier wars were typically waged by a wide range of actors, 
including the monarchy, the church, feudal lords, etc.—in most cases mainly by 
means of professionals, i.e. mercenaries. 42
  
For this reasons as well as because of the scarcity of means to rent and/or arm 
and equip armies inter alia because of inadequate capacity to tax the population) 
wars were usually rather limited, the opposing armies manoeuvring rather than 
fighting and often doing so in order to avoid encountering the adversary  than to 
force him into battle. When actual fighting nevertheless took place, it was 
almost exclusively directed against the soldiers of the respective opponent. Of 
course there were civilian victims and suffering in such wars, e.g. in the form of 
looting and sporadic violence, including rape, by the soldiers, but these effects 
were rather limited and far from indivisible as they could be escaped from. 
However, in parallel with the growth of populations it became more difficult to 
flee (at least permanently) which invested the effects of war with a public evil 
character. As argued by Jeffrey Herbst, however, this trend was largely confined 
to Europe, whereas escape remained an option in most of Africa because of its 
low population density.43  
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On top of these direct consequences came side-effects such as an easier spread 
of infectious diseases by marauding armies, and often a reduction in the harvest 
yields and a heavier taxation for the financing of the war—but even these 
consequences tended to be rather moderate.  
 
Modern Wars 
Certain changes took place in this system during the Renaissance as a result of 
the “military revolution” of the 16th and 17th centuries, inter alia ?? related to a 
strengthening of the state. This entailed an improved taxation capacity which 
allowed for larger and standing armies, a growing arms production, etc.44 Even 
though this made wars more of a burden on the civilian population (creating a 
larger public evil), the real transition to modern wars only occurred with the 
combination of the French and the industrial revolutions by the end of the 18th 
Century.   
 
The industrial revolution made it possible to equip mass armies, and the French 
Revolution allowed for mobilising such armies through universal conscription 
(“levée en masse”). Conscription might be seen as representing the norm (which 
gradually spread to the rest of Europe) that the state should represent the people 
(the principle of people’s sovereignty), whose duty is therefore was to contribute 
to the defence of the state.45  National defence was thus defined as a public 
good, as were to a certain extent  even wars of aggression which were also 
supposed to serve the interests of the state and, ipso facto, also of the people. 
When war, as formulated by Clausewitz, was conceived of as a “continuation of 
politics by other means”,46 and when politics was to by determined by (or at 
least on behalf of) the people, then the spoils of war were to be seen as public 
goods for the society in question—which did not, of course, rule out abuse on 
the part of incumbent governments who merely had to claim that their political 
goals served the common good. 
 
The costs of war, on the other hand, became a public evil, both because of the 
civic duty to serve in the military and the more effective taxation, not least 
intended to finance wars. Another public evil appeared as a consequence of the 
emergence of mass armies, which not only made wars more destructive but also 
made it harder to escape from them. The culmination of modern wars was the 
two world wars of the 20th Century, both of which represented unprecedented 
public evils. Whereas the casualties in the first were mainly military (but usually 
conscripted citizens), in the second they were mostly civilian—partly as a result 
of the massive aerial bombardment of major cities, intended to defeat the 
respective opponent by indirect means, i.e. by inflicting harm on his civilian 
society.47
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Nuclear War and Deterrence 
The culmination of these aerial bombardments of civilian targets were, of 
course, the two nuclear bombs used by the USA against the Japanese cities 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945,48 which heralded a new era. As most 
were soon to realise, nuclear weapons and war could henceforth (as formulated 
by Bernard Brodie)49 only serve to prevent war, since the gap between means 
and ends had become too unbridgeable for war to remain rational in the sense of 
something that could be waged with gain. 
 
Nuclear war thus came to be seen as an obvious public evil, and the more so the 
more became know about the indirect and long-term side-effects of nuclear 
weapons such as long-term radioactive contamination.50 In the 1980s research 
findings were published according to which even a medium-sized nuclear war 
(i.e. one in which neither side used its entire arsenal) might effect climatic 
changes (the so-called “nuclear winter”)51 which would make the Earth largely 
uninhabitable by humans and other vertebrate species. To this unquestionable 
public “super-evil” were added other side-effects such as radio-active 
contamination as a result of atmospheric nuclear tests (until the entry into force 
of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963) as well as, of course, the economic 
costs of the nuclear arms race. 52
 
It may nevertheless be disputed that nuclear deterrence as such was a public evil. 
No nuclear weapons were ever used, and the upkeep of the nuclear arsenals may 
still have been cheaper than it would have been to deter the respective opponent 
by means of conventional forces. An argument can also be made to the effect 
that nuclear deterrence was the main reason for “the long peace” experienced by 
Europe,53 which was undoubtedly a collective good of sorts as it did not merely 
include the members of the two alliances, but also neutral states. It would, 
however, be a logical fallacy to deduce from the fact that deterrence did not fail 
to its having been required in the first place. As pointed out by John Mueller and 
others, many alternative explanations of the long peace recommend 
themselves.54
 
On the other hand, it is impossible to disprove that nuclear weapons were a 
major cause pf the long peace. It  seems plausible (albeit impossible to prove) 
that nuclear weapons have had a general deterrent effect, i.e. that one side’s 
nuclear weapons have not merely deterred the respective other from a nuclear 
attack, but that the “existential deterrence” (a term coined by McGeorge Bundy) 
worked at all levels.55 Precisely because the arsenals and their deployment were 
designed to safeguard the ability to retaliate under all circumstances, they 
entailed a certain risk of being triggered by mistake—e.g. as a result of a 
misinterpretation of warning indicators, because of a technical error, or via a 
“Dr. Strangelove scenario”, starting with a human error and then producing a 
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crisis spinning out of control.56 However, exactly these risks and their 
potentially apocalyptical consequences gave both sides to the confrontation a 
very strong incentive to step very gently in their interaction with the other.57
 
It is thus worth noting that (as far as is known) not a single shot was ever fired 
between the two superpowers during the entire Cold War, and very few between 
their respective allies. Wars were, however, fought by the two blocs “by proxy” 
in the 3rd World. Here each side typically supported its side in wars, be they 
between states or between rebel movements and states aligned with the 
respective opponent.58 These proxy wars were undoubtedly public evils for the 
civilian population in the countries where they were fought, but they still do not 
quite satisfy the criteria of global public evils, as they were presumably 
beneficial for the “backers”, who were also able to escape the consequences.  
 
“Wars of the 3rd Kind” 
After the end of the Cold War (1989/91) other forms of war have attracted 
attention which have been labelled “new wars” (Mary Kaldor), “uncivil wars” 
(Donald Snow) or “wars of the third kind” (Kalevi Holsti).59
 
They are wars like those we have witnessed in the Balkans (e.g. in Bosnia and 
Kosovo)60 as well as in Africa (e.g.  in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the so-called 
Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC),61 but which resemble previous wars such 
as those in Lebanon or Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal.62 These 
wars have typically involved actors other than those appearing in the modern 
wars mentioned above—both a larger number so that they could not be 
understood as bipolar, and other actors than states. Many have even been fought 
in the absence of organised non-state actors such as guerrilla movements and 
have presented a complex picture of government forces and militias (including 
child soldiers), warlords, bandits, etc. 
 
These actors have, moreover, rarely have clearly defined political goals, so that 
the wars cannot be understood as any “continuation of politics by other means”. 
Either war has been fought over control of resources such as minerals or 
timber—or war itself has become a form of life, a trade and a business for those 
involved, who have therefore not really fought for anything, but rather continued 
the war for its own sake and for the sake of the ideal conditions which the state 
of war had created for all sorts of murky, but profitable, business ventures.63  
 
Such wars almost exclusively harm the civilian population who are, moreover, 
not “merely” collateral casualties, but often the direct target of warfare. 
Sometimes the purpose is simply to expel the civilian population in order to gain 
unhindered control over a piece of territory. In certain ethnically and/or 
religiously motivated wars, it is even waged against the civilian population as 
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the embodiment of values which are deemed by the combatants as incompatible 
with their own, or against the antithetical ethnic identity itself. War may thus 
assume the form of veritable genocides as in Rwanda64 and/or it may feature 
forms of “combat” such as organised rape, intended to “contaminate” the nation 
being fought, as it happened extensively in Bosnia.65
 
All too often, alas, all of the above motives are combined. Such “wars of the 
third kind” are indisputable evils, often of massive proportions, such as the war 
in the DRC with an estimated casualty toll of more than three million, almost 
exclusively civilians.66 They also meet the criteria of public evils, as they inflict 
harm indiscriminately and because the victims cannot escape the consequences. 
Their prevention will therefore represent a public good.  
 
Even though these wars of the third kind are (“by nature”) intrastate wars, many 
become internationalised, i.e. transformed into what might be called 
“transnational wars” which typically involve neighbouring states as secondary 
actors.67 On the other hand the frequency of “real” international wars has been 
decreasing (or at least remained at a very low level), as is apparent from Table 1. 
Some of the wars which are here counted as international (e.g. in the Balkans) 
are even wars of secession which have merely been labelled international as a 
consequence of a (more or less unanimous, but almost always arbitrary) 
international recognition of the secessionist parts, whereas other wars of 
secession have been categorised as intra-state, either because the secessionist 
movements have not achieved international recognition or because they have 
lost (or perhaps not yet won) the war in question, as is, for instance, the case of 
the war in southern Sudan.68
 
Table 1: Armed Conflicts 1989-200269
Category 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Intra-state 43 45 52 51 42 42 33 33 30 31 29 28 29 26 
Transnat. 2 2 1 2 5 1 1 1 3 5 6 4 5 4 
Internat. 3 3 1 1 0 0 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 
 
A few of the international wars belong to the classical type, which was (to some 
extent, at least) the case of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea from 1998 to 
2000,70 whereas others are more appropriately called “interventions”. Most of 
these have even—at least by those undertaking them—been referred to as 
“humanitarian”, i.e. as motivated by humanitarian concerns.71
 
We shall revisit these humanitarian interventions below. Suffice it therefore at 
this stage to indicate that to the extent that these interventions are really 
humanitarian (or at least predominantly humanitarian, as most wars can have a 
host of different motives) they may be said to be military actions for the creation 
of public goods. Whether they deserve this label also depends on whether they 
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succeed in actually mitigating the humanitarian problems in question, and 
whether the costs of doing so (e.g. measured in terms of human lives) compare 
favourably with the gains. There is no automatic correspondence between 
humanitarian motives and consequences, and it is perfectly conceivable that 
interventions spurred by humanitarian concerns may exacerbate the 
humanitarian problems—or indeed that interventions undertaken for other 
reasons may lead to a clear improvement of the humanitarian situation. Whereas 
the US (but UN-authorised) intervention in Somalia probably belongs to the 
former category, Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia may belong to the latter, 
as it removed from power one of the most genocidal regimes the world has ever 
known.72    
 
Indirect evils 
Many of the above-mentioned wars have wide-ranging side-effects, almost all of 
which deserve the label of public evils. One of the most prominent side-effects 
of wars is flows of refugees, often massive and usually going to immediate 
neighbours, as illustrated by the statistics for the Horn of Africa in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Refugee Flows in the Horn of Africa73  
(thousands, only included if the number exceeded  5,000 in at least one year) 
Origin Residence  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Djibouti Ethiopia - 0.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 8.0 3.0 1.5 1.6 0.1 
Eritrea Sudan 502.6 424.5 419.3 282.8 328.3 315.0 342.3 342.1 367.7 324.5 
Ethiopia Sudan 200.9 173.2 160.6 48.1 51.5 44.3 35.6 35.4 34.1 16.1 
Somalia Djibouti 20.0 17.7 20.6 21.3 23.0 21.5 21.6 21.6 21.7 21.7 
Somalia Ethiopia 406.1 228.1 269.7 305.4 287.8 249.2 195.3 180.9 121.1 67.1 
Sudan Ethiopia 25.6 44.4 51.8 61.1 75.7 56.9 58.6 70.3 71.7 80.9 
 
This table does not, however, distinguish between war refugees and people 
fleeing for other reasons, e.g. because of natural disasters or famine. Even the 
latter may, however, well be indirect war refugees, as wars often have 
detrimental environmental consequences and hamper agricultural production, 
thus jeopardising food security.74
 
On top of these indirect effects come the expenses incurred by upholding a 
certain level of armaments, and the negative effects of this on the national 
economy, not least for developing countries. Even though some have claimed 
that an arms build-up in “backward” countries may contribute to 
modernisation,75 most analysts today agree that the opposite is normally the 
case, i.e. that an arms build-up comes at the expense of economical and social 
development.76 As these negative side-effects typically affect the entire 
economy, they represent clear public evils. 
 
For industrialised countries the same applies, even though there is often a certain 
“spin-off” from investments in military high technology, especially as far as 
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research and development (R&D) are concerned—to which effect the internet 
and the GPS (global positioning system) may testify. However, this gross effect 
of large R&D investments should rightly be compared with the hypothetical 
effects of a comparable investment in civilian R&D, which most analysts agree 
would be larger, inter alia because concerns for national security often require 
that military research remains classified, which hampers spin-off.77 In this sense, 
military expenditures represent unproductive “waste”, and even more so for the 
large majority of countries that rely on imports for almost all their military 
equipment, thus not benefiting from spin-off effects at all. Concerns for national 
security may, however, make such “waste” indispensable.          
 
Other indirect costs derive from the losses incurred by the collaboration with 
neighbouring countries (or others) that does not take place because of wars or 
the preparations for war. These so-called “opportunity costs”, likewise, have 
indiscriminate effects, thus representing public evils.78 Even though it is 
complicated (and inevitably counterfactual) to calculate the hypothetical gains 
from a trade with others that does not take place because of the presumed risk of 
war, they may well be considerable, at least when affecting (as in the East-West 
conflict) developed countries with a large foreign trade, at least with the 
potential for this.79  
 
Trade, Democracy and Peace 
We may even be dealing with a vicious circle here, as foreign trade and the 
resultant interdependency between states have been credited by many80 
(especially liberalists) with having a war prevention effect. If the fear of war 
curtails trade it will thus eliminate some of the inhibitions against war, thus 
making it more likely.81
 
Almost all wars also have detrimental effects politically, e.g. with regard to 
human rights. At the very least, the freedom of expression is usually limited in 
warring countries or countries experiencing acute fears of war, to which are 
often added internments of (allegedly) potential traitors and “fifth columnists”—
inter alia because many issues, about which debate and expressions of dissent 
would otherwise be entirely legitimate become “securitised” (i.e. transformed 
into issues of national security) which may be (ab)used to justify “extraordinary 
measures” such as limitations on civil rights.82
 
In this field as well we may be encountering a vicious circle, because wars and 
preparations for them thus tends to weaken or even destroy democracy, thereby 
removing what the same liberalists regard as an important obstacle to war. This 
theory of the “democratic peace”83 (dating back to Immanuel Kant)84 comes in 
three varieties,85 which may be labelled monadic, dyadic and systemic, the latter 
appearing in both a weak and a strong version. 
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• The monadic version has it that democratic states are simply more peaceful 
than non-democracies, inter alia because decisions about going to war will be 
taken by the entire population, i.e. by those who would be most affected by 
the consequences of war. However plausible this thesis may appear, there are 
is no statistical evidence to support it, at least as far as international wars are 
concerned, which are just as often started by democracies as by non-
democracies. On the other hand, there is strong empirical support for the 
thesis that democracy may prevent intra-state conflicts, or rather make the 
resort to violent means in such conflicts less likely.86  
• According to the (much more prominent) dyadic version, democratic states 
are very reluctant to go to war against each other, inter alia because they 
understand each other better due to the more transparent  mode of decision-
making. Even though it is often claimed that there is strong empirical 
evidence to support this thesis, the evidence is actually much more 
ambiguous  in fact the theory may be either trivial or dubious. Either it rests 
on a solid empirical foundation, the relevance of which is questionable (as 
with the numerous analyses based on the behaviour of the Greek city states 
during the Pelloponesian War in the 5th Century BC),87 or it rests on a rather 
narrow empirical basis of  obvious relevance, i.e. stable modern democracies, 
of which there have been quite few. If the empirical basis is extended to 
include partial democracies such as the German Empire prior to the First 
World War in 1914, or Serbia prior to the Kosovo War of 1999, too many 
exceptions to the general rule appear (in the sense of democracies actually 
going to war against each other) for the theory to remain unfalsified. If the 
criteria are tightened for what to count as democracies, the result not only 
becomes a too narrow empirical basis on which to base a theory. This small 
population of stable democracies also consists of states which have numerous 
other reasons not to go to war with each other, making it impossible to 
determine what role democracy may play. 
• According to what we may call the “weak systemic version”, it is simply 
possible to generalise or extrapolate from the dyadic to the global level, i.e. 
that of the system. Considering that the world may be viewed as consisting of 
dyads of states (Denmark-Norway, France-Uzbekistan, Uruguay-Malawi, 
etc), the total likelihood of war may presumably be reduced by making as 
many states (and by implication dyads) as possible democratic. This variant 
may, however, be criticised for being reductionist, as quite different 
dynamics and rules may apply at the systemic and the dyadic level—just as a 
book is not necessarily well-written, just because all words are spelled 
correctly and the grammar of each sentence is correct. 
• The strong version of  the systemic variant of the democratic peace theory 
claims that war may be prevented by means of democracy at the systemic 
level, i.e. some form of global or cosmopolitan democracy,88 terms which are 
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hard to define and undoubtedly even harder to realise. Does global 
democracy mean that all states should have the same influence, or that all 
citizens should? The logical implications of the former would be that China 
with its 1.3 billion inhabitants should only have the same influence as, say, 
Denmark with around five million, whereas the latter would mean that China 
should have four times as much power as the United States and 250 times as 
much as Denmark. A combination of the two may also be possible, e.g. in a 
bicameral system in which one chamber represents the states and the other 
the peoples. But is it likely that the West would relinquish power to the 
extent implied by such a system? And does global democracy not presuppose 
that all the component parts, i.e. the states, are democratic, as it surely cannot 
be taken for granted that government of non-democracies always speak and 
vote on behalf of their citizens. 
  
Peace as a Public Good: The “Peace Dividend” 
If peace is a public evil it almost logically follows that peace must be a public 
good, either for the individual state or for world society as a whole. In this sense, 
the public goods aspects of peace are sometimes referred to as the “peace 
dividend”.89 Even though this dividend may assume many different forms,90 
most attention has been given to its economic aspects. 
 
War and the preparations for war simply cost money which may be saved in the 
case of peace and, even more so, as a consequence of expectations of a lasting 
peace, making preparations for war superfluous or, at least, less urgent. How this 
peace dividend may be “cashed in” via arms reduction or disarmament, 
however, is more complicated, just as measuring the peace dividend is difficult. 
Apart from what is measurable, of course, non-economic benefits of expending 
societal resources on something useful also need to be considered. 
 
It is certainly possible to approach these matters from a macro-economic 
perspective, taking national account figures of defence expenditures as the point 
of departure and combining this with the multiplier to assess the indirect 
consequences.91  As far as the salary part of defence expenditures is concerned, 
it will have to take into account the rate of employment, determining whether 
former military staff can be employed in the civilian sectors of the economy or 
whether they will end up on the dole or in early retirement; the difference 
between former salaries and future pensions or unemployment benefits (as well 
as potential “golden handshakes”); the share of income and consumer taxes of 
this difference; the savings and import rates of disposable income; and the 
demand implications of the anticipated decline in income for the affected 
personnel. 
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As far as the remaining costs are concerned, the import rate is an important 
factor, especially for countries such as Denmark which have only a very limited 
indigenous production, but where co-production agreements may, on the other 
hand, have to be factored into the calculation, likewise taking account the 
multiplier effects.92 Even though no calculus shall be attempted here, a 
reasonable assumption is that the net effect of gross savings on the defence 
budget will be much smaller net gains, at least in the short term. It also matters 
whether the dividend is simply saved, e.g. by reducing the public debt or 
lowering taxes,93 or whether it is recycled and if so to what.94    
 
All this is further complicated if an attempt is made (as has been done)95 to 
calculate the macro-economic effects of global reductions of military 
expenditures, as this will depend on which countries stand for how large shares 
of total reductions, how the reductions are subdivided into salaries, weapons 
purchases and other expenses; what the import rates are for the respective 
countries, both for arms purchases and for consumer goods; what the tax rates 
are; how the saved funds are spent, etc. Unfortunately, however, global military 
expenditures do not seem to decline. Rather, after an initial decline following the 
end of the Cold War they seem to be rising again as shown in Table 3, which 
does not even take the most recent (and very substantial) rise in the US defence 
budget into account. 
  
Tabel 3: Global Military Expenditures (bill. US$, constant 2000-prices and exchange rates)96
Region 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Africa 7 8 7 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 
N-America 365 344 324 306 304 298 299 310 313 344 
C-America 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 
S-America 18 17 20 18 21 20 20 20 22 21 
Asia 120 121 123 128 128 127 129 134 140 147 
Europe 196 192 178 177 177 175 177 180 181 181 
Middle East 54 54 50 52 57 61 60 67 74 n.a. 
World 762 740 707 691 696 690 696 723 741 784 
Change n.a. -2,9% -4,4% -2,3% 0,7% -0,9% 0,9% 3,9% 2,5% 5,8% 
   
If we apply a combined micro-economic and sociological perspective to the 
elusive peace dividend, further complications arise, as there is far from perfect 
substitution, neither with regard to productive capacity nor to personnel. Hence, 
plants which see their orders for military equipment decline cannot necessarily 
convert into civilian production, the numerous studies of such plant-level 
conversion notwithstanding.97 Nor are all military personnel directly employable 
in the civilian sector. In countries with general conscription a large part of this 
problem is, of course, statistical, as they have the option of shrinking their armed 
forces simply by refraining from conscripting part of an age cohort or by 
shortening the term of service. This simply entails that there will be more young 
people to share the available jobs. In other countries, the problems are more 
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concrete, as it is here a matter of dismissing employees who may or may not be 
retrained for other jobs which may or may not be available.98
 
In the aforementioned “wars of the third kind” this is often a very acute 
problem. If a peace is signed after a protracted civil war a large part of both 
government forces and former insurgents need to be disarmed and demobilised. 
It the former soldiers and/or guerrillas are not provided with alternative 
employment and integrated into civilian society, experience shows that they will 
often resort to arms again, either through a renewed rebellion or in criminal 
activities, thereby  benefiting from their skills in the use of weapons. 
Considering that societies such as these are often in a desperate economic 
situation caused by a protracted armed conflict, there is usually a need for 
foreign aid for such “DDR&R”-programmes (for disarmament, demobilisation, 
repatriation and reintegration).99 A successfully implemented DDR&R-
programme would warrant the label of a public good as it may be a precondition 
for preventing a conflict from flaring up again which may easily affect an entire 
region.   
 
The Provision of Peace as a Public Good 
In principle there are many ways to create the public good, not least by limiting 
the public evil represented by wars and preparations for them. It stands to reason 
that different types of measures will be called for to prevent different kinds of 
wars, to bring different forms of raging armed conflicts to a halt and thus to 
make the preparations for them superfluous. There are no instruments or 
strategies of universal applicability but rather a need for a well-stuffed “tool 
box” and a broad panoply of strategies and skills. Likewise, the involvement of 
a wide variety of categories of actors may prove relevant. 
 
The scope of the present article does not allow for anything like an exhaustive 
account of these issues, and will thus confine itself to a categorisation of actors, 
strategies and instruments. Needless to say, these are closely linked, as 
instruments must be selected according to what is attempted, i.e. the strategy, 
which in turn is determined by the actors on the basis of their identities, interests 
and goals.  
 
Actors: Identities, Interests and Goals  
The most obvious actors involved in the provision of global public goods are, of 
course, international organisations which are almost “born” in order to produce 
public goods or reduce public evils. Relevant distinctions here are geographical 
ones between global, regional, subregional and other organisations; and 
functional ones between, on the one hand, organisations created in order to 
manage problems of peace and security and, on the other hand, organisation 
which may either make indirect contributions towards these ends or which 
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become involved almost by accident. Table 4 enumerates some of the most 
important international organisations that have already played such roles. 
 
Table 4: International Organisations Involved in Peacemaking (examples) 
 Global Regional/subregional Others 
Created for 
peace  
UN (Security Council and 
Secretariat) 
OSCE NATO 
Created for 
other ends 
UN organisations (UNHCR 
etc.) World  Bank, WTO 
ASEAN, ECOWAS, IGAD Commonwealth, G-8 
Both peace and 
other ends 
 EU, OAS, OAU/AU, ARF, 
SADC, CIS 
 
Legend: UN: United Nations; OSCE: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe; NATO: North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation; UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; WTO: World Trade 
Organisation; ASEAN: Association of South-East Asian Nations; ECOWAS: Economic Community of West 
African States; IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development; EU: European Union; OAS: Organisation 
of American States; OAU: Organisation for African Unity; AU: African Union; ARF: ASEAN Regional 
Forum; SADC: Southern African Development Community; CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States 
 
A standing debate within IR theory is whether international organisations are 
independent or, at least, autonomous actors with their own identities and 
interests or mere instruments for the interests of the states comprising their 
membership. This controversy is closely related to the aforementioned one 
between neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists (sætningsopbygning??), 
where the former represent the first point of view and the latter the second. The 
answer to these question may well be either/or, as some organisations, even 
though they may have been created by great powers as their instruments, may 
gradually develop their own identities and play partly independent roles, at least 
in areas which none of the stronger member states regard as “vital issues”. They 
may thus gradually build capacities (provided by member states) for 
independent action. 
 
Another category of potential actors are the states which are, however, also parts 
of the problem. A useful distinction may be between states which are directly 
involved and others. Most of the following considerations, however, also apply 
to the parties to the above-mentioned wars of the third kind, i.e. to both states 
and rebel movements if only the latter are relatively organised.  
 
Even though the states involved have, on the one hand (usually, albeit not 
always) an interest in avoiding war, they have an equally obvious interest in not 
losing it, should it nevertheless occur, and these two sets of considerations may 
well point in opposite directions. The latter interest may call for an arms build-
up before the war as well as for an escalation after it has begun, which may well 
make the very outbreak of war more likely and increase the destructiveness of 
the ensuing war. It is thus highly significant how the two sets of interests are 
prioritised.  
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Some analysts have, for instance, claimed to have identified a radical change of 
priorities in the USSR around 1983/84, based on a reassessment of the chances 
of avoiding war as better than previously assumed. This made it less urgent to 
guard against losing and generated an interest in disarmament and international 
cooperation, i.e. in the provision of public goods. In conformity with this 
amended set of priorities, the Soviet leadership around Gorbachev thus suddenly 
took the debate on “global problems” (e.g. related to the environment) seriously 
and accepted a share of responsibility for their solution, which it had previously 
refused.100  
 
The reverse may, of course, also be true, i.e. that a party to a conflict comes to 
realise that it cannot win, which gives it an obvious incentive to bring the 
conflict to a halt on the best obtainable terms, often couched in terms of a truce 
and a subsequent peace treaty. It is even possible that both sides may reach such 
a conclusion simultaneously, but unfortunately this does not automatically lead 
to peace.  Sometimes a continuation of the war may still appear to decision-
makers as the lesser evil, as they would otherwise have to justify the “sunk 
costs” which the war has already brought about, both economically and in terms 
of human lives. Moreover, the very state of war can have its attractions, and 
decision-makers may further be concerned about their international reputation, 
which may be decisive for their position of power in the longer run. A state 
which has to surrender almost invites attacks in the future or to have its vital 
interests infringed upon by others at a later stage,101 at least unless it allows itself 
to be protected by others, as was the case of post-war Germany and Japan.  
 
Sooner or later, however, what William Zartmann has aptly called a “hurting 
stalemate” usually develops, i.e. a situation where both sides realise that neither 
one can prevail, but where this stalemate also hurts, which gives both sides an 
incentives ?? to sue for peace.102 The same may be the case in a cold war such as 
the East-West conflict where the arms race imposed burdens on both sides, but 
especially on the USSR as the weaker side, which it was unable to shoulder in 
the long run. 
 
External powers may also play a role in such conflicts, either between states or 
between states and rebel movements.103 In some cases they may be affected by 
the conflict (e.g. as host countries for war refugees), providing them with a clear 
self-interest in bringing the conflict to a halt. In other situations, their 
international role may almost demand involvement. A global or regional 
hegemony that does not interfere in a serious conflict within its sphere of 
influence risks loosing part of its acceptance as hegemony. Finally, there are 
certainly states (to which Denmark has traditionally belonged) which simply 
take their international (legal or moral) obligations seriously.   
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Besides states and international organisations (consisting of states), non-state 
actors can occasionally play a role. These may be subdivided into various 
categories, depending on their character, identity and ambitions, i.e. their self-
defined roles. In Table 5 such a categorisation of some important actors has been 
attempted, but it should be noted some actors combine different roles. 
Table 5: Non-State Actors (examples) 
Character 
Role  
NGOs Firms Others 
Policy-making, 
information 
Peace movements,  ICG,  
AI 
  
Humanitarian MSF, ICRC,    
Mediation SCG  Churches 
Other  PMCs  
Legend: NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation; ICG: International Crisis Group, MSF: Médicins sans 
Frontiers, ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross, SCG: Search for Common Ground; PMCs: Private 
Military Companies 
 
 
FIG. 1: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
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The figure describes the ideal picture of rational decision-making, whereas 
reality is often much more diffuse. Rather than optimising the effort, decision-
makers frequently need to “satisfy” (as administration theory has it, as an 
alternative to optimising),104 i.e. to opt for the first reasonably satisfactory 
solution—also because decisions have to be made urgently and often not in the 
“right” order. If a country has become engaged in one conflict in one country 
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this may often exclude its becoming involved in a conflict elsewhere, even  if 
the latter is more serious and important. 
 
Strategies, Methods and Instruments 
The above (categories of) actors have widely diverging identities, interests and 
objectives, which is, inter alia, manifested in different strategies, which all 
amount to specifying goals in terms of subordinate objectives and allocating 
means to these goals and objectives. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 1 actors are faced with a number of questions in these 
respects, not least because they usually have to prioritise their activities, inter 
alia in order to maximise public goods. This obviously means that it would be 
irrational to expend resources on tasks which are insoluble if this comes at the 
expense of some that would be soluble. 
 
We may also categorise the relevant measures by their timing, e.g. in relation to 
a conflict cycle as illustrated in Figure 2.105
 
Fig. 2: The Conflict Cycle 
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rank imbalances, etc.,107 i.e. the removal of the basic causes of conflict. As far as 
developing countries are concerned, development aid may be used as a means to 
this end, as many donors have indeed come to realise.108 The codification of 
rules may also contribute to structural prevention, both as far as general rules 
(e.g. in international law) and more concrete ones (such as arms control 
agreements) are concerned.109
 
Operational conflict prevention is about preventing an immediately impending 
conflict outbreak, and here most attention has been devoted to the need for early 
warning as a background for preventative action. Unfortunately, both are 
hampered by serious complications. 
 
As far as early warning is concerned, the requisite data are often missing. Even 
if data are available, even the best ones lend themselves to divergent 
interpretations.110 Moreover, even if the relevant decision-makers reach the 
conclusion that a conflict is impending, they will have to make sure that they 
will be able to subsequently substantiate this assessment. This will, ironically, 
become the more difficult the most successful potential preventative initiatives 
will be. If they succeed 100 percent, the result will be that nothing happens, and 
it will be very difficult to prove what would have occurred in the absence of the 
preventative measure. 
 
This may not be an insurmountable problem as long as merely “soft” 
instruments are employed such as support for civil society organisations, 
mediation efforts and the like, but it will be a serious obstacle to more 
“muscular” measures such as economic sanctions111 or (even more so) military 
intervention. Considering that “old-fashioned” economic sanctions typically hurt 
the innocent the most, recent years have seen a growing interest in the 
development of “smart” sanctions which specifically affect the guilty ones, 
typically state leaders.112 If panoply of such smart sanctions is available, 
preventative actions will be far less problematic to undertake. 
 
When a conflict has erupted in violent struggle (be that in the form of an 
international or a civil war) soft instruments will often be ineffective. There 
may, however, still remain some scope for mediation initiatives, just as 
sanctions may be imposed on one or both parties to an armed conflict, usually in 
the form of an arms embargo. Even though it will now be easier to justify some 
form of engagement (as the problem is now obvious) the costs of interference by 
military means have also risen. In a civil war situation it will often require the 
deployment of armed forces mandated to enforce a truce, which may often entail 
actual combat operations and may cost lives. In the case of non-vital interests 
such as civil wars in foreign countries, most countries (and not least 
democracies) have a very low tolerance for casualties. 
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The situation is somewhat different once a conflict has peaked, either because of 
war fatigue or simply because the stocks of ammunition have been depleted. 
Now a truce can often be negotiated (perhaps with the involvement of “third 
parties” in the role as mediators) and peacekeeping forces may be deployed to 
monitor its observance.113 While this is fairly unproblematic in international 
wars and “traditional” civil wars between two well-organised parties it is far 
more complicated in the wars of the third kind described above. Usually, not all 
parties sign the agreed truce, and there is rarely a generally accepted line of 
demarcation between the parties, which might be monitored and patrolled by 
peacekeeping forces.114  
 
If the peace or truce is successfully kept this breathing space may be exploited 
for actual conflict resolution initiatives (sometimes referred to as “post-conflict 
peace-building”) in order to prevent the conflict from flaring up again upon the 
departure of the peacekeepers. A central element in such conflict resolution will 
be dealing with the underlying causes of the conflict, making conflict resolution 
almost identical with the aforementioned structural conflict prevention, yet with 
the significant difference that it takes place after a violent conflict and therefore 
does not suffer from the same justification problems as prevention. Many 
different measures may recommend themselves for conflict resolution, including 
political reforms ensuring some power-sharing,115 economic measures to reduce 
inequalities such as land reforms, etc. 
 
Conclusion 
There are thus numerous ways of preventing, managing and resolving violent 
conflicts, all with a view to reducing the public evil represented by war and 
thereby promoting peace as a public good.  
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